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Abstract
Reputation eﬀects have been thought to inﬂuence how candidates in an election are viewed by the
electorate. Using data from Major League Baseball, I attempt to quantify the eﬀect that reputation
plays in voting for the Gold Glove award. While the award is designed to reﬂect current-year defensive
accomplishments, two other hypotheses have been suggested to explain voting behavior. The ﬁrst is
that voters use current-year oﬀensive accomplishments in lieu of defensive accomplishments. The second
hypothesis is that voters rely on the past performance of the players when casting their ballots, implying
that reputation eﬀects exist in the minds of voters. Results from probit estimation show that while
reputation eﬀects appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the outcome of the election, current-year oﬀensive
accomplishments do not.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Award voting, such as for end of the season sports awards or motion picture awards like the Oscars, diﬀers
from voting for public oﬃce in that the award voters generally do not have a stake in the outcome of the
election. Perhaps the only stake award voters have is that their voting privileges may be revoked if it is
decided that they have done poorly, whereas larger stakes (economic and social concerns) abound in the
political arena. Despite the lesser impact on society as a whole, award voting may have substantial impact
on individuals. In the case of sports, many players have incentive clauses based upon the outcome of the
award voting, where the incentives may be in the million dollar range. Or consider economists vying for the
Nobel Prize — not only do they receive the award money if they win, but they then also have the beneﬁto f
increasing their appearance fees. Thus, determining the information and decision rules that award voters
use when casting their ballots may be of great importance to the individuals associated with these awards,
and may also uncover which information people use when voting.
The award under study is the Gold Glove award, given annually in each of the two leagues in Major
League Baseball. The award is supposed to be given to the best defensive player at each position, although
there is no speciﬁc criteria which deﬁnes the term “best”. There is some speculation that voters rely on
oﬀensive, or batting, performance when casting their ballots for the Gold Glove award. In addition, given
that there have been a number of players who have won the award for their position multiple times, it is
possible that voters rely on a rule of thumb where they choose the current year winner based upon who has
previously won the award. The goal of this paper is to determine which information is actually used by
voters when they cast their ballots.
There is very little published research on award voting. One paper, Ginsburgh [3], discusses the rela-
tionship between economic success and award success for movies and books. However, he does not provide
a detailed statistical study of the possible criteria used in the award voting. Another paper, Coupe [1],
discusses best paper awards in economics and ﬁnance journals, and ﬁnds that the papers chosen as best
papers are not necessarily the ones that will be most cited. Finally, Hamermesh and Schmidt [4] discuss
the determinants of being elected as an Econometric Society Fellow. While this is likely the most closely
related study in terms of technique and data, the elections in [4] are once and for all elections; thus, there is
no possibility for repeated selection as a winner.
1The topic is tangentially related to ﬁelds in other disciplines. There is a vast literature in political science
discussing incumbency advantages in political elections. Given that players who win multiple Gold Glove
awards typically win them consecutively, it is possible that an incumbency advantage exists for the player
who won the award the previous year. It is also possible that halo eﬀects surround certain players. A halo
eﬀect can be described as generalizing from one outstanding trait of a person or object to an overly favorable
evaluation of the entire person or object. The ﬁelds of sociology, labor economics, and marketing all discuss
halo eﬀects with respect to people or products. Halo eﬀects are related to incumbency advantage in that a
successful performer one year may have a halo eﬀect bestowed upon him that carries over into the next year.
Section 2 of the paper presents background informa t i o no nt h eG o l dG l o v ea w a r d ,i t sw i n n e r s ,a n dt h e
amount of turnover in the electorate throughout the time period. Section 3 provides a detailed description of
the data used, and section 4 presents the empirical models used to test the hypotheses. Section 5 discusses
the results of the estimation, and section 6 concludes.
2A w a r d H i s t o r y a n d F a c t s
The Gold Glove award was created in 1957 by Rawlings Sporting Goods to award defensive excellence at
each ﬁelding position and was promoted by T h eS p o r t i n gN e w s 1.I n t h e ﬁrst year of the award, 1957, only
one winner per ﬁelding position from all of Major League Baseball (MLB) was chosen. From 1958 to 1961,
one winner at each of the nine ﬁelding positions is chosen from each of the two leagues, the American League
(AL) and the National League (NL). In 1962, the process of selecting outﬁelders changed. Prior to 1961
one outﬁelder at each outﬁeld position (left-ﬁelder, center-ﬁelder, and right-ﬁelder) was chosen from each
league. From 1961 to the present, the position speciﬁc requirement for outﬁelders was dropped from the
voting process, meaning that three outﬁe l d e r sw h op l a y e dt h es a m ep o s i t i o nc o u l da l lw i nt h eG o l dG l o v e
award2.
The award winner for each position is determined by a plurality vote. In 1957, a committee of 19
sportswriters voted for the award winner. In 1958, active players voted for the award winner. The process
of players voting for the award lasted until 1965. Since 1965 MLB managers and coaches have comprised
the electorate. The voting structure is relatively simple, as managers and coaches vote for one player in their
league whom they feel has been the best defensive player at each position. The vote is conducted near the
end of the baseball season and the only stipulation is that voters cannot vote for players on their own team.
The ﬁnal balloting is covered in a cloud of secrecy — complete vote totals are not available for the Gold Glove
award, which is unlike most other MLB awards. Most other recognized awards in MLB, including the Most
Valuable Player, the Cy Young, the Rookie of the Year, and Hall of Fame voting, have complete vote totals
available for each year.
The only rules governing the voting process are that each voter selects only one player at each position
and that a voter cannot vote for players from his own team. Thus, the minimum standard that must be
met for eligibility is that the player must be in the league at the time of the vote. Historically this has not
led to positional inconsistencies, such as a shortstop winning the ﬁrst base award, but the recent selection
of one award winner caused a considerable amount of controversy. The AL Gold Glove winner at ﬁrst
base in 1999 was Rafael Palmeiro of the Texas Rangers. The controversy was not about Palmeiro’s ﬁelding
ability, as he had won the award in the past, but about the fact that Palmeiro played in 158 games during
the season and only 28 of them (18%)w e r ea tﬁrst base. In fact, he won the Gold Glove award for ﬁrst
base while winning another award, the Silver Slugger award3, as the AL’s best designated hitter, which is
an o n - ﬁelding position. While the selection of Palmeiro is perhaps the most extreme example, other past
selections suggest that voters for the Gold Glove award rely more on reputation than current performance
when casting their ballots.
2Catcher 1st base 2nd base 3rd base Shortstop
#d i ﬀerent winnners 27 22 28 23 30
#d i ﬀerent AL 13 12 12 12 13
#d i ﬀerent NL 16 11 16 13 17
# both leagues 2 1 0 2 0
Player with most Bencha Hernandez Sandbergb Robinson Smith
#m o s t 10 11 9 16 13
a Ivan Rodriguez passed Bench with 11 total in 2004
b Roberto Alomar passed Sandberg with 10 total in 2001
Table 1: Statistical information on award winners
2.1 Award Winner Information
This section provides background information on the number of Gold Glove award winners at the ﬁve inﬁeld
positions (catcher, 1st base, 2nd base, 3rd base, and shortstop). From 1957-1999 there were 85 total winners
at each position, one each year from each league from 1958-1999 and one winner at each position in 1957.
Table (1) breaks down the number of diﬀerent winners for each of the ﬁve inﬁeld positions in various manners.
There have been between 22 and 30 diﬀerent winners at each position, and for each league there have been
between 11 and 17 diﬀerent winners. Only ﬁve players have ever won a Gold Glove in both leagues: Tony
Pena and Bob Boone as catchers; J.T. Snow as a 1st baseman; and Matt Williams and Robin Ventura as
third basemen. No player has ever won a Gold Glove award at multiple inﬁeld positions in his career.
The last two rows show the player who has won the most Gold Gloves at a position and the number of
Gold Gloves that player won. Note that 9 Gold Gloves is a little more than 10% of the total number of
awards given at a position, while 16 Gold Gloves is a little less than 19%. Thus, these players have won
a large share of the total Gold Gloves awarded, and an even larger share considering that players are only
eligible to win one of the two Gold Gloves awarded at their position each year. It should also be noted
that each of the ﬁve players that have won the most Gold Gloves at their position also won those awards
consecutively4. Thus, it may be that the players were consistently better than their peers over the time
period during which they won the Gold Glove, or it may be that the players developed a reputation early in
their careers and a halo eﬀect was bestowed on them as voters overlooked some small declines in ability.
2.2 Voter Turnover
While the individual choice of each voter will likely never be known, it is possible to approximate voter
turnover for the time period since the voters for the Gold Glove award are the managers and coaches in
MLB. From this point on, I will use the term coaches to refer to both coaches and managers. Calculating
voter turnover is important because it creates a starting point for the discussion of reputation eﬀects. If the
identities of the voters for the Gold Glove award change rapidly then it may be diﬃcult to hypothesize that
reputation eﬀects exist. However, if the identities of the voters change slowly, then it is plausible that the
voters may use some measure of previous performance when casting their ballot.
Using data from Thorn [6], from 1965-2000 there were 857 total coaches, with 583 diﬀerent American
League coaches and 535 diﬀerent National League coaches. Figure 1 shows the average decay rate for all
coaches and managers in MLB, as well as by individual league. The decay rate is calculated in the following
manner. Begin by ﬁxing a year, say 1965, and then determine the percentage of coaches who were still
coaching in MLB each of the 34 years later. Call this the decay rate for the 1965 coach cohort. Call
the percentage change in coaches from 1965 to 1966 the 1-year percentage change in the 1965 cohort, the
percentage change in coaches from 1965 to 1967 the 2-year percentage change in the 1965 cohort, etc. Then
ﬁx the second year, 1966, and calculate the percentage of coaches still coaching in MLB in each of the 33
1This section is based on Deane [2], who provides a more detailed history of the award as well as some anecdotal evidence
on voting behavior.
2Prior to 2001, this had occurred 3 times in the NL and 11 times in the AL. All of these occurrences involve 3 center-ﬁelders
winning the award.
3The Silver Slugger is given to a player at each position in each league based on their oﬀensive contributions.




































Figure 1: Average percentage of coaches remaining after a given number of years has passed
following years. The percentage change from 1966 to 1967 is the 1-year percentage change in the 1966 cohort.
Continue the process for the remaining years from 1967-1998. The decay rate in ﬁgure 1 is calculated as
the average of each of the t-year percentage changes. Thus, the 1-year percentage change in the ﬁgure has
34 observations (one for each year from 1965-1998), while the 34-year percentage change uses only the result
from 1965. An identical process was used to calculate the decay rates for coaches in the AL and NL. Note
that the coaches in the AL and NL decline at a faster rate than those in MLB as a whole, as some coaches
will change leagues.
Suppose a player wins a Gold Glove in time period zero. From ﬁgure 1 we can see that approximately
44% of the coaches who were active in MLB that year will still be active in MLB 7 years later. For the
individual leagues about 30% of the coaches are still active in the same league 7 years later. At year 12
the percentage of coaches who were active in MLB falls to 30%, while the percentage who are still active
in each league is around 20%. Given these numbers, it is possible that some players who have been active
in a league for a few years beneﬁt from a reputation eﬀect built up in an earlier year. Additionally, many
coaches were former players and may have formed opinions about the ability of current players while the
coach was an active player. Thus, it is unlikely that a ﬁrst-time coach is just beginning a career in MLB
and is watching the players for the ﬁrst time.
3D a t a
The data used in the analysis is taken from the Lahman database [5] and spans the years 1957-1999. A
variety of quantitative and qualitative independent variables are used5. Quantitative variables can be
broken into defensive and oﬀensive variables. The defensive variables are total games played at the position,
putouts, assists, errors, double plays participated in, and ﬁelding percentage. All of these variables are
counting variables except for ﬁelding percentage. Fielding percentage is calculated as the ratio of successful
defensive chances to total defensive chances6. The defensive variables are position speciﬁc per player per
year in the database, so that if a player plays multiple positions throughout the year only those defensive
statistics recorded at that position are tabulated. As an example, Jose Oquendo appeared at every position
for the St. Louis Cardinals in 1988. He has seven diﬀerent entries7 for his defensive statistics, one for each
5Deﬁnitions of the oﬀensive and defensive measures can be found at MLB’s website, www.mlb.mlb.com.
6Technically, I calculate this as (putouts + assists)/(putouts + assists +errors).
7The three outﬁeld positions are listed as one position in the data until 1996, when they are listed as three separate positions.
4Position #,games ≥ 1 #,games ≥ 25 #,games ≥ 50 # diﬀ winners
Catcher 3262 2173 1564 27
1st base 4749 1808 1292 22
2nd base 3828 1776 1278 28
3rd base 4266 1792 1248 23
Shortstop 3475 1727 1251 30
Table 2: Number of players who have appeared at a position in the data
position he played. Thus, Oquendo appears as seven “diﬀerent” players in 1988, at least according to his
defensive statistics.
The oﬀensive statistics used in the study are runs scored, hits, homeruns, runs batted in (RBI), walks,
stolen bases, batting average, slugging percentage, and on-base percentage. The ﬁrst six variables listed are
counting variables, while the last three variables are rates. The oﬀensive statistics are not position speciﬁc;
that is, if a player appears in the data as both a second baseman and a shortstop during one season then his
oﬀensive statistics for that season are the same for each entry in the data. In the aforementioned case of
Jose Oquendo, the oﬀensive statistics for each of his seven defensive entries would be the oﬀensive statistics
he accumulated over the course of the entire season.
Some may argue that there may be better measures of oﬀensive and defensive performance, usually
termed sabermetric measures. However, the sabermetric measures are complex and most of these measures
had not been developed until the 1970s and 1980s; thus these measures were unavailable to voters in the
early part of the study. Although the creation of these measures may have impacted the award voting, it
is unlikely given that the measures have just recently begun to gain favor in the majority of the baseball
community. Since the purpose of this study is to determine what factors impact the probability of winning a
Gold Glove award, and not to determine if the voters actually voted for the “best” defender at the position,
the traditional oﬀensive and defensive statistics are used instead of the newer measures.
The qualitative variables used typically reﬂect some form of reputation that the player may have devel-
oped. There are two seasonal binary variables. The ﬁrst takes the value 1 if the player’s team reached the
postseason during a given year and 0 otherwise. It is commonly thought that players whose teams make the
postseason receive a boost in end of the year award voting. The second seasonal binary variable takes the
value 1 if the player makes the All-Star team during a given year and 0 otherwise. Selection to the All-Star
team, while typically based on oﬀensive achievement, may push some players names ahead of others in the
voters’ minds. Although players may have appeared at more than one position during any given year, the
All-Star binary only registers as a 1 for the player’s primary position, as determined by the position at which
he played the greatest number of games. As an example, Kirby Puckett appears in 2 games as a second
baseman and 149 games as an outﬁelder in 1992. He was also selected to the all-star game in that season.
Since his outﬁeld games are larger than his second baseman games, his All-Star binary as a second baseman
in 1992 registers as a zero.
The ﬁnal variables used in the study are the reputation variables pertaining to prior Gold Glove award
voting outcomes. The ﬁrst variable used is a count of Gold Glove awards that a player has won prior to the
current season. Thus, it can be seen if winning more Gold Glove awards increases one’s chances of winning
another Gold Glove. A second variable used is a binary that registers as a 1 if a player has ever won a Gold
G l o v ea w a r di nt h ep a s t .
The positions evaluated in this study are limited to the inﬁeld positions (ﬁrst base, second base, third base,
shortstop and catcher). Pitchers are not evaluated because there is very little variation in the defensive and
oﬀensive data for pitchers as most pitchers do not participate in more than 250 innings per year8.O u t ﬁelders
are not used in the analysis for two reasons. First, there is the aforementioned change in the voting process
in 1961, which removed the outﬁeld position speciﬁc voting. Second, there are some data aggregation issues
with outﬁelders.
Table 2 breaks down the number of players who have appeared at each position according to diﬀerent
games played criteria. Note that this games played criteria is defensive position speciﬁc, so that a player
who appears in 150 games as a shortstop and 2 games as a second baseman will be included in the “#, games
8Typically, regular players at the other positions will participate in more than 1000 innings per year.
5≥ 1” column for both positions but will only be included in the columns for “games ≥ 25” and “games ≥
50” for the shortstop position. The columns for 25 games and 50 games are included because it will be
necessary to remove those players who only appeared in a handful of games at a position when considering
oﬀensive statistics, as some players may have played a few games at a position but many games overall,
increasing their oﬀensive totals9. While the choices of 25 and 50 are arbitrary, at the 25 game level all of
the Gold Glove winners still remain in the data set as the lowest total games played at a position for which
a Gold Glove was won is the 28 games at 1st base by Rafael Palmeiro. All results reported in the following
sections are for the 50 game criteria, since there are little quantitative and qualitative changes in the results
if the 25 games criteria is used.
4 Empirical Models
Various empirical models are used to test the validity of the competing hypotheses. The simplest model
incorporates ﬁelding statistics for the current season, which is what the guidelines of the award suggest
should be used. Let Yipt be a binary taking the value 1 if a player i won a Gold Glove at a particular
position (p)i nag i v e ny e a r( t) and 0 otherwise. Let Dipt be a vector comprised of the defensive statistics
described above and δ be a corresponding vector of parameters. Let Xi denote a vector of league and
time dummy variables, and ν be its associated vector of parameters. The league and time dummies will be
present in all models. The term εipt is the error term in all models. The “defense-only model” is then:
Yipt = f (Diptδ + Xiν + εipt) (1)
The defensive statistics initially used in the defense-only model will be games ﬁelding at the position,
putouts, assists, errors, double plays participated in, and ﬁelding percentage. Due to possible multicollinear-
ity among the variables, some variables may be removed from the equation if they do not meet commonly
accepted levels of signiﬁcance10.
For the defense-only model, it is expected that the signs of all the defensive variables will be positive
except for errors. The rationale behind this expectation is that making more successful defensive plays
(putouts, assists, and double plays) should lead to a greater probability in winning the Gold Glove, while
making more unsuccessful plays (errors) should lead to a lower probability. The coeﬃcient on ﬁelding
percentage should also be positive, as having a higher ratio of successful plays to total plays should also
increase one’s chances of winning the award. Diﬀerent positions may have diﬀerent signiﬁcant regressors.
This is particularly true in the ﬁrst base and third base model, as ﬁrst basemen typically do not have many
assists and third basemen typically do not have many putouts.
The second model incorporates the oﬀensive statistics, which are denoted by the vector Hit.L e t t i n g η
be its vector of parameters, the “oﬀense-defense model” is:
Yipt = f (Diptδ + Hitη + Xiν + εipt) (2)
The oﬀensive statistics that will initially be used are: runs, hits, homeruns, RBI, stolen bases, walks,
batting average, slugging percentage, and on base percentage11. Again, some variables may be removed
from the equation if they do not meet commonly accepted levels of signiﬁcance.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the defensive variables in the oﬀense-defense model are expected to have the
same signs as in the defense-only model. Given that all of the oﬀensive variables have positive value towards
winning games, it is expected that the oﬀensive variables will have positive signs. This is particularly true
if the hypothesis that voters are relying on oﬀensive measures when casting their ballots is true.
Finally, let Ript be a vector representing the reputation parameters and ρ be its vector of parameters.
The “full model” is:
9See the previous example regarding Kirby Puckett appearing as a second baseman in 1992.
10The time and league dummies will not be removed regardless of their levels of signiﬁcance. Excluding those variables does
not alter the results.
11Due to limitations in the data, on-base percentage is calculated as (walks plus hits) divided by (at bats plus walks),
neglecting hit by pitches, sacriﬁce ﬂies, and catcher’s interference. The small number of occurrences of these events should not
impact on-base percentage for a large percentage of the players.
6Yipt = f (Diptδ + Hitη + Riptρ + Xiν + εipt) (3)
The reputation measures consist of binaries for being selected to the all-star team in that year, the player’s
team reaching the postseason, and winning a previous Gold Glove award. In addition, a count of previous
G o l dG l o v ea w a r d si sa l s ou s e da sam e a s u r eo fr e p u t a t ion. It is expected that the signs on the estimated
coeﬃcients of the reputation measures will all be positive, as reputation eﬀects as they are measured here
reﬂect positive aspects of reputation.
5R e s u l t s
The results of the probit estimation for the restricted version of the full model12 described in equation (3) are
contained in table 3, while results for the restricted models described in equations (1) and (2) are contained
in tables 5 and 6, respectively. In addition, results for an oﬀense-only model are contained in table 4. All
models used data sets where the number of games played at the position was greater than or equal to 50.
Using an alternative cutoﬀ of 25 games played at a position yields little diﬀerence in both the qualitative and
quantitative coeﬃcient estimates. All models also contained dummy variables for year and league, which
are not reported here due to space limitations. Most of the dummy variables were not statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the 10% level.
The middle three columns of table 3 show the coeﬃcient estimates, standard errors, and p-values for the
regressors that were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level for the individual positions. The only
common variable across all 5 positions is the binary representing whether or not the player had previously
won a Gold Glove award. All models include either putouts or assists (or both), as these variables seem
to act as a censoring mechanism; the more putouts or assists a player amasses, the better his chance of
winning the Gold Glove. The rather large coeﬃcients on ﬁelding percentage and on base percentage can
be explained by the fact that these variables are rate st a t i s t i c sm e a s u r e di nt h o u s a n d t h s ,w i t ham a x i m u m
value of 1; thus, increases in these variables should be viewed as a one-one thousandth unit increase rather
than a one-unit increase.
Perhaps the most startling result is the lack of statistical signiﬁcance of oﬀensive statistics in the restricted
version of the full model, as a common belief among baseball professionals and aﬁcionados is that voters
use oﬀensive statistics in lieu of defensive statistics when casting their ballots. In the catcher, ﬁrst base,
and second base models, no oﬀensive variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In the third
base model, the only oﬀensive variable that is statistically signiﬁcant is RBI, which suggests that voters put
some weight on production at the plate when choosing a third base award winner13.T h e s h o r t s t o p m o d e l
is the only model which includes multiple oﬀensive statistics: runs scored, hits, homeruns, stolen bases,
walks, and on base percentage. However, three of these oﬀensive statistics (hits, homeruns, and walks) have
negative coeﬃcients, suggesting that there are some oﬀensive events which detract from a player’s possibility
of winning the award. It is possible that the negative coeﬃcients on walks and hits are oﬀsetting the positive
value of a higher on base percentage, although a likelihood ratio14 test suggests that these variables are jointly
signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient on stolen bases may reﬂect an unobserved individual eﬀect, speed and
quickness, that most observers deem necessary to perform well as a defensive shortstop. Thus, stolen bases
may act as a proxy for speed and quickness, which may not be captured by the defensive statistics. The
ﬁnal oﬀensive variable, runs scored, appears to be similar to RBI for third basemen.
The coeﬃcients for the defensive variables all have the correct sign, and the results can be explained
from the viewpoint of a baseball observer. The variables total games played at a position and double
plays participated in are not signiﬁcant in any models. The failure of total games played to appear in
any of the models is unsurprising, as there is likely a collinear relationship between games played and the
performance based counting measures (putouts, assists, and errors). It was typically the case that the
removal of the games played variable from the probit equation substantially altered the signiﬁcance of the
remaining counting measures, which suggests this collinearity. However, it is surprising that double plays
12Results for all unrestricted models are available from the author upon request.
13This is not unusual as voters for most awards in baseball, particularly the Most Valuable Player Award, tend to be enamored
with the RBI statistic.
14This test is discussed in detail below.
7Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value χ2 P-value
Putouts 0.00231 0.00097 0.01714
Assists 0.03204 0.00813 0.00008
Catcher Errors −0.05044 0.02542 0.04743 9.9594 0.7651
Allstar 0.76705 0.21718 0.00043 df =1 4
Won before 1.17040 0.19174 < 0.00001
Putouts 0.00307 0.00063 < 0.00001
1st base Errors −0.11277 0.03222 0.00048 20.8028 0.1432
Won before 1.48298 0.31409 < 0.00001 df =1 5
Prev Amt 0.12907 0.06704 0.05444
Putouts 0.00603 0.00332 0.06974
Assists 0.00785 0.00265 0.00316
2nd base Fielding pct 72.31809 24.47603 0.00319 18.5342 0.1383
Postseason 0.71085 0.25585 0.00555 df =1 3
Allstar 0.93797 0.23087 0.00005
Won before 1.30177 0.21699 < 0.00001
Assists 0.01091 0.00307 0.00039
3rd base Fielding pct 25.91087 10.55147 0.01420 13.528 0.5616
RBI 0.02134 0.00568 0.00018 df =1 5
Won before 1.54079 0.22696 < 0.00001
Putouts 0.01505 0.00495 0.00240
Fielding % 81.53809 14.25952 < 0.00001
Runs 0.03028 0.01140 0.00804
Hits −0.01839 0.00919 0.04554
Shortstop Homeruns −0.03789 0.02003 0.05873 12.91696 0.2039
Stolen bases 0.01445 0.00690 0.03652 df =9
Walks −0.01964 0.01175 0.09492
On base pct 12.95638 6.38070 0.04252
Allstar 0.47378 0.26613 0.07529
Won before 0.81414 0.23908 0.00068
Table 3: Probit estimation results for the restricted models
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value χ2 P-value
Catcher Hits 0.02763 0.00442 < 0.00001 1.6812 0.9754
Batting avg −8.67360 4.59873 0.05947 df =7
Runs 0.01788 0.00886 0.04380
1st base Hits 0.01430 0.00447 0.00142 5.0598 0.5362
Slugging pct −6.45482 1.62830 0.00008 df =6
Homeruns 0.05834 0.01274 0.00001
2nd base Walks 0.07482 0.01858 0.00006 3.5042 0.6228
Batting avg 69.07822 15.98684 0.00002 df =5
On base pct −69.54434 17.43661 0.00007
3rd base Hits 0.00660 0.00412 0.10981 7.9632 0.3359
RBI 0.02749 0.00489 < 0.00001 df =7
Runs 0.01429 0.00632 0.02389
Homeruns −0.06275 0.02410 0.00934
Shortstop RBI 0.01740 0.00966 0.07187 1.0132 0.9078
Stolen bases 0.02103 0.00609 0.00057 df =4
Walks 0.00924 0.00560 0.09898
Table 4: Probit estimation results for the oﬀense-only restricted models
8Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value χ2 P-value
Games 0.01549 0.01043 0.13767
Putouts 0.00207 0.00123 0.09318 1.2878 0.5252
Catcher Assists 0.02751 0.00820 0.00082 df =2
Errors −0.06900 0.02276 0.00247
Putouts 0.00280 0.00052 < 0.00001
1st base Assists 0.00716 0.00431 0.09698 3.3388 0.3423
Errors −0.13394 0.02654 < 0.00001 df =3
Games 0.03025 0.01158 0.00911
2nd base Assists 0.00501 0.00226 0.02712 2.632 0.4519
Fielding pct 77.93951 19.10462 0.00005 df =3
3rd base Assists 0.01500 0.00202 < 0.00001 1.0196 0.9068
Fielding pct 33.01677 8.93300 0.00023 df =4
Putouts 0.00798 0.00397 0.04476
Shortstop Assists 0.00323 0.00194 0.09567 2.3438 0.5042
Fielding pct 74.03203 12.71675 < 0.00001 df =3
Table 5: Probit estimation results for the defense-only restricted models
participated in does not have as large an eﬀect, particularly for the second base and shortstop positions, as
turning a double play is typically regarded as an important skill for these positions.
In the catcher model, putouts and assists are both signiﬁcant and positive, while errors made is signiﬁcant
and negative. Catchers are rewarded for making plays in which an out is recorded and penalized when they
fail to make plays where an out should be recorded. The coeﬃcient on assists is ten times as large as the
coeﬃcient on putouts, which likely reﬂects the belief that a good defensive catcher is one who throws out a
large quantity of would-be base stealers, as about 50%-60% of catcher assists are from throwing out runners
attempting to steal. The absence of ﬁelding percentage at the catcher position may be because the counting
measures absorb most of the eﬀect of ﬁelding percentage or because catchers tend to be measured more on
level eﬀects rather than rate eﬀects. One variable which was not available in the data set which would
likely be a useful measure for catchers is the percentage of runners thrown out attempting to steal. While
assists may act as a proxy for this measure, it is possible for some poor catchers to have a larger assist total
than their outstanding counterparts due to the fact that more stolen bases are attempted against the poor
catchers.
Only two defensive variables are signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst base model, putouts and errors. First baseman,
unlike the other positions, is generally not regarded as a skill position; most ﬁelding chances for a ﬁrst
baseman are likely to be receiving throws from other inﬁelders. Thus, a good defensive ﬁrst baseman is
typically regarded as one who can catch throws from other players, regardless of where the throws may be.
In most cases, if a throw is errant a ﬁrst baseman is not charged with an error, so there tends to be little
variation in ﬁelding percentages among ﬁrst baseman. The absence of assists as a signiﬁcant regressor is
not surprising given that ﬁrst baseman are typically not required to make many assists. Oftentimes if a
ball is batted towards a ﬁrst baseman he will ﬁeld the ball himself and then record an unassisted putout by
touching ﬁrst base.
The signiﬁcant defensive variables for the remaining positions have similar explanations. At second
base, putouts, assists, and ﬁelding percentage are the signiﬁcant variables. At third base, only assists and
ﬁelding percentage are signiﬁcant. Third basemen are essentially the opposite of ﬁrst basemen, in that most
of the value from the third basemen comes from his ability to throw the ball across the diamond to record
an assist. Third basemen typically have the fewest putouts among the inﬁeld position, which is why that
regressor is not signiﬁcant. For shortstops, putouts and ﬁelding percentage are the only signiﬁcant defensive
variables. This is quite surprising as most baseball observers would like choose assists as the more relevant
of the counting measures for shortstops.
As previously mentioned, the only variable that is common across all 5 positions is the binary reputation
variable that records if a player has previously won a Gold Glove award. Among the 5 positions, the
9estimated coeﬃcient is lowest among shortstops, which may reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tm o r ed i ﬀerent players have
won Gold Glove awards at shortstop than at any other inﬁeld position.
The allstar variable is signiﬁcant for catchers, second basemen, and shortstops. While this seems to
suggest that voters rely on allstar reputations when casting their votes, it may also reﬂect the belief of
baseball professionals that it is important to be defensively sound in the middle of the ﬁeld (catcher, second
base, shortstop, and centerﬁeld). Thus, the causal relationship between allstar selections and Gold Glove
awards is debatable, although selection to the allstar team occurs prior to Gold Glove voting. The fact that
the allstar variable is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst base and third base models supports the belief that teams
look primarily for players who can contribute oﬀensively at these positions, and that fans (who vote for the
allstar game starters) also emphasize oﬀensive over defensive contributions from these positions.
The ﬁrst base model is the only one that includes the amount of Gold Gloves previously won as a signiﬁcant
regressor. The signiﬁcance of the amount of awards previously won in that model may be attributable to
two factors. The ﬁr s tf a c t o ri st h a tb e c a u s eﬁrst base is viewed as the least demanding position, good
defensive ﬁrst basemen may remain competitive in the award voting even after they have passed the primes
of their careers. At other positions, once players “lose a step or two” it is likely to be more noticeable to
observers, and they may vote for a younger, more athletic player. Also, it may take more time for voters
to form an opinion of a ﬁrst baseman as a defensive player, which may cause them to select more veteran
players. Thus, once a ﬁrst baseman gains inertia as an award winner, the only thing that may slow him
down is retirement.
The ﬁnal two columns contain the χ2 statistic for a likelihood ratio test, the degrees of freedom for the
χ2, and the p-value for the statistic. The likelihood ratio test can be used to test for the joint signiﬁcance of
regressors. The test statistic is computed by taking the diﬀerence of the likelihood functions of a restricted
and unrestricted model and multiplying that diﬀerence by negative two. The statistic is distributed χ2
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. The unrestricted model for table 3
corresponds to the “full model” in equation (3), and contains the time and league dummy variables as well as
t h e1 9r e g r e s s o r s( 6d e f e n s i v es t a t i s t i c s ,9o ﬀensive statistics, 4 reputation measures) for all positions. The
number of restrictions imposed diﬀers in most of the models, as diﬀerent positions had diﬀerent regressors
which were deteremined to be signiﬁcant.
Let r be the number of restrictions imposed on the model and βi be the coeﬃcient for the ith regressor
for which a restriction is imposed. The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test is then βi =0 ∀i =1 ,..,r.
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one βi 6=0 . Note that the lowest p-value, for the second base
model, is 0.1383, which means that the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% level. Thus, the omitted
regressors are not jointly signiﬁcant at the 10% level for any of the models. The next section shows that
removing those regressors does not substantially alter the predictive power of the model.
Tables 4-6 show the results for three restricted models: oﬀense-only, defense-only, and defense-oﬀense. In
these models, only variables in the categories that correspond to the model name are used. Thus, the oﬀense-
only unrestricted model has 9 variables, defense-only has 6 variables, and oﬀense-defense has 15. Results
are shown for those models where only signiﬁcant regressors are used in the estimation, and likelihood ratio
tests are performed to test for the joint signiﬁcance of the removed regressors. In all models, the regressors
that were removed from the equation were not jointly signiﬁcant. For all of the models, the signs on the
estimated coeﬃcients in the restricted version of the full model (table 3) are identical to the signs in the
restricted versions of the other three models. Thus, adding the reputation measures does not alter the
signs of those regressors that are signiﬁcant, although the reputation measures may cause some regressors
to become insigniﬁcant. In addition, the quantitative value of the regressors that remain signiﬁcant when
the reputation eﬀects are added change only slightly.
5.1 Predictions
In addition to the t-statistics and likelihood ratio tests, a goodness-of-ﬁt measure is used to test the predictive
power of the models. A standard goodness-of-ﬁt measure involves calculating the predicted value (ˆ yi) of
the dependent variable for each observation, and then classifying that observation as a 0 if ˆ yi < 0.5 and
1i fˆ yi > 0.5. The predicted classiﬁcations can then be compared to the observed value of the dependent
variable, and percentages can be obtained to see how many times the model yields correct predictions.
In this study, I use a modiﬁed version of the goodness-of-ﬁt measure. Given that only one player at each
10Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. Error P-value χ2 P-value
Putouts 0.00242 0.00089 0.00653
Catcher Assists 0.03275 0.00779 0.00003 8.565 0.6620
Errors −0.06912 0.02371 0.00361 df =1 1
RBI 0.01538 0.00423 0.00028
Putouts 0.00268 0.00071 0.00018
Errors −0.12204 0.02768 0.00001
1st base Runs 0.02226 0.00959 0.02049 7.8692 0.5474
Walks −0.00758 0.00498 0.12774 df =9
Batting avg 7.82634 4.63850 0.09181
Slugging pct −6.29683 2.16575 0.00371
Putouts 0.00792 0.00300 0.00844
Assists 0.00671 0.00246 0.00644
Fielding pct 85.08968 21.19704 0.00006
Hits −0.02582 0.01223 0.03498
2nd base Homeruns 0.06290 0.01662 0.00016 5.0818 0.5334
Stolen bases 0.01352 0.00828 0.10301 df =6
Walks 0.06700 0.03709 0.07112
Batting avg 86.91510 37.75753 0.02151
On base pct −69.11532 34.14888 0.04319
Assists 0.01393 0.00264 < 0.00001
Field pct 39.04854 9.08772 0.00002
3rd base Hits −0.01616 0.00903 0.07386 2.3688 0.9927
RBI 0.02852 0.00636 0.00001 df =1 0
Batting avg 12.82103 6.93071 0.06458
Putouts 0.01378 0.00484 0.00447
Field pct 96.85161 14.45526 < 0.00001
Runs 0.03411 0.01260 0.00689
Hits −0.02230 0.01130 0.04871
Shortstop Homeruns −0.08378 0.03629 0.02113 2.1383 0.9065
RBI 0.02371 0.01475 0.10819 df =6
Stolen bases 0.02433 0.00667 0.00027
Walks −0.01879 0.01188 0.11408
On base pct 15.13292 6.62312 0.02249
Table 6: Probit estimation results for the oﬀense-defense restricted models
11Catcher 1st base 2nd base 3rd base Shortstop
Models using all regressors
Defense, oﬀense, & reputation 55 52 62 64 56
All oﬀense only 31 29 33 31 32
All defense only 41 32 34 40 42
All defense & oﬀense 42 31 45 46 55
Models using only signiﬁcant regressors
Defense, oﬀense, & reputation 53 50 59 63 55
Oﬀense only 29 26 32 31 29
Defense only 40 34 36 41 37
Defense & oﬀense 42 32 48 47 51
Lagged 53 56 50 50 44
Table 7: Number of correctly predicted winners of the Gold Glove award at each position by various model
speciﬁcations
position per league can win a Gold Glove award each year, I calculate the predicted value for each player
and then compare that value with the predicted values of the other players at that position who were in the
league that year. The player with the highest predicted value per league per season is then selected as the
predicted winner of the Gold Glove award among that league/season cohort.
The results of the prediction analysis for nine models are contained in table 7. The ﬁrst four rows of
table 7 show the number of correctly predicted winners by a particular model containing all of the variables
in a given category. For instance, the “All defense only” row shows how many correct predictions were
made using the coeﬃcient estimates from the model where all 6 defensive variables were used as regressors,
while the “All oﬀense only” row shows the number of correct predictions made using the coeﬃcient estimates
where all 9 oﬀensive variables were used in the estimation process. The second set of rows shows the number
of correct predictions made when only the signiﬁcant regressors are present. Note that each of the positions
may have a diﬀerent set of regressors in these models, which are listed in tables 3-6. The prediction results
for the models with only reputation eﬀects are not reported due to the fact that 3 of the 4 variables are
binary, leading to a large number of ties for the predicted winners15.T h e ﬁnal row uses a simple measure
for predicting the current year winner, which is to assume that the player who won the award the previous
season will win it again in the current year. While this measure is simplistic, it provides a baseline to which
the probit estimation predictions can be compared.
Table 7 shows that the models with reputation eﬀects outperform the other models in predictive ability,
and in some cases by substantial amounts. The oﬀense only models are particularly poor predictors, with
a maximum number of 33 correct predictions out of 84 winners (39%). The best predictors are the models
using all 19 variables, except in the case of the 1st base model where the simple lagged player model correctly
predicts four additional winners. While it may be expected that the model with the most regressors predicts
the best, note that the models only including the signiﬁcant regressors for defense, oﬀense, and reputation
have the second highest amount of correct predictions, and that these are not much lower than the amount
of correct predictions by the models using all 19 variables16. In fact, the simple lagged model outperforms
every model except the ones including reputation eﬀects for all positions but shortstop. Thus, it does not
appear as if it is the inclusion of meaningless additional regressors that is driving the prediction results, but
that the reputation eﬀects have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the voters’ decisions. This supports the results of
table 3, which suggest that reputation eﬀects play a large role in determining the voters’ decisions.
15As an example, in the 1st base model, there were 8 two-way ties and 3 three-way ties.
16The maximum diﬀerence is 3 in the 2nd base model, and this is still 11 more correct predictions than the next closest 2nd
base model, not including the lagged model.
126C o n c l u s i o n
Of the three hypotheses discussed at the outset, it appears as if voters use a combination of defensive
measures and reputations when making their decision about the Gold Glove award winner. The models
that include reputation eﬀects are the best predictors, and in some cases substantially so, of Gold Glove
award voting. This suggests that the voters may be relying more on reputation than on actual defensive
performance, while the guidelines of the award state that the winner should be determined based on defensive
performance for the current season. Although there is speculation that improvement in oﬀensive performance
also increases a player’s probability of winning a Gold Glove award, there is little evidence to suggest that
oﬀensive performance impacts the voting process on a regular basis. While there certainly may be individual
instances where oﬀensive performance enters into voting decisions, these appear to be isolated instances.
There is additional information that may add to the ability of the models to correctly predict the winner.
One piece of information that could be included is a measure of record-breaking performance. Many baseball
observers pay considerable attention to consecutive game streaks, so that a player who commits no errors
in many consecutive games receives more attention than a player who makes less errors, but has them
spread more evenly over the course of the season. Thus, the focus on the player with the record-breaking
performance may enhance that player’s reputation at the expense of a better defensive player. Another
possibility is to determine the league leaders among the diﬀerent oﬀensive and defensive categories, as league
leaders may gain more notoriety than those who do not lead the league in a category.
The results from Gold Glove award voting show that voters may use a rule of thumb involving reputation
eﬀects when casting their ballots, instead of relying on available information that is relevant according to the
guidelines of the award. While this study only focuses on a small subset of voters, baseball coaches, and one
award, it does suggest that future studies of voting behavior incorporate measures of candidate reputation
in their analysis.
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